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ci.2012.0Abstract In the recent years, we have seen the emergence and the growing of the e-business via the
internet. Many organizations are extending their business transactions by using the Web. This will
allow them to reach more customers in a cost effective way and to make their business transactions
fast and efﬁcient. Meanwhile, sending sensitive information via the Web must satisfy integrity, pri-
vacy, authentication and non-repudiation. Organizations are implementing various infrastructures
that allow them to have secure e-business transactions. Many protocols and frameworks have been
proposed and implemented to provide secure and trusted exchange between parties involved in the
transaction. These frameworks store credentials such as keys in local computers which make them
subject to piracy or misuse. In this paper, we propose a framework based on smart card that allows
partners to realize secure transactions. The proposed solution use smart cards to store keys and per-
form cryptographic algorithms.
ª 2012 King Saud University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The lack of user conﬁdence in electronic business is the greatest
inhibitor obstructing the growth of e-commerce. Data travel-
ing over public networks can be easily compromised. Busi-
nesses must ﬁnd ways to authenticate customers, remote
ofﬁces, suppliers and partners while ensuring the security of
transactions and sensitive information. Several solutions aim
at securing e-business transactions and protecting sensitive
information by implementing different techniques (ChienSaud University.
g by Elsevier
. Production and hosting by Elsev
5.002et al., 2002; Wassim et al., 2007; Mornar et al., 2004). A grow-
ing number of organizations are building Public Key Infra-
structures (PKI) to solve e-business security issues.
However, implementing a PKI is not enough. Keys, certif-
icates and digital signatures must be protected the same way
you protect a passport or your credit cards.
Storing digital certiﬁcates on the LAN or on your computer
makes it fairly easy for others to copy the certiﬁcate and then
use it to impersonate you. Smart cards are an ideal secure stor-
age device. This paper presents an e-business framework based
on smart cards. Keys, certiﬁcates and digital signatures are
stored in the card. The card also performs the onboard cryp-
tography operations. Another advantage of this solution is
the portability of the smart card that allows the person per-
form the transaction from any computer on the network. By
using the smart card, storing multiple digital signatures, certif-
icates, private keys, IDs and passwords on a smart card solvesier B.V. All rights reserved.
Figure 3 The smart card framework architecture.
Figure 1 Authentication ﬂow.
Figure 2 Integrity and privacy ﬂow.
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in the card is protected by a PIN. Usually, the user enters the
PIN to unlock the card and allows applications the access to
the protected information (IDs, Passwords, Keys, Certiﬁ-
cates,). The user is no more asked to enter his username and
password that can compromise the security of the transaction
(Chen and Yeh, 2005; Hirano et al., 2007). The communica-
tion between the card and the client program is protected by
session keys generated by the card. It is almost difﬁcult for
an attacker to spy the cryptography mechanism executed by
the card. Before initiating the transactions, the user and the
server, the parties participating in the e-business transaction,
should be authenticated to each other. This paper presents
an e-business framework based on smart card. Section 2 pre-
sents the e-business transactional model and the necessary
phases to provide secure and trusted transactions. In Section 3,
we describe the architecture of the proposed e-business frame-
work. We present in Section 4 the implementation of the pro-
totype using the java card technology. In the conclusion we
present some planned future work.2. The transaction e-business model
In (Hirano et al., 2007) an authentication framework was pro-
posed to provide device-oriented authentication and authoriza-
tion mechanisms for Internet information appliances. The
purpose of the framework is to prevent device spooﬁng, and
to restrict unauthorized access to the device in a future ubiqui-
tous network. The framework does not take in charge the entire
security of the transition and is limited only to protect the trans-
action between the device and the user program. Chien et al.
(2002) propose an integrated scheme based on hash functions
to provide a simpler solution to integrated authentication and
access control. However, their scheme is vulnerable to attacks
and is limited to authentication and access control scheme
based on hash functions. Juang (2004) proposes a multi-server
user authentication and key agreement scheme using smart
cards. The proposed solution is limited to provide a password
authenticated key agreement in multi-server environments.
Torres et al. (2007) propose an extended authentication model
for the network based on smart cards. The proposed model
integrates smart cards in the authentication process applied
to a practical payment scenario. This model did not take into
consideration security issues related to the transaction.
Our approach proposes an e-business model allowing
authentication, integrity and privacy of the transaction by
using keys stored in the smart card. This section describes
the proposed e-business transaction model. The model de-
scribes a secure protocol between two parties involved in the
e-business transaction. It allows a client or customer to
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cure transaction ensures the authenticity, integrity and privacy
of the messages exchanged between the client and server dur-
ing the session. In the following, we designate the term client
to identify the party initiating the transaction (customer, client
or partner) and the server the party receiving the transaction
request (merchant, or supplier). In order to accomplish the
transaction, both the client and the server should hold the pub-
lic key of each other. The e-business model is based on sym-
metric and asymmetric encryption. The e-business
transaction is realized in two phases: the authentication phase
and then the integrity and privacy phase. The e-business trans-
action between the client and the server should start by a mu-
tual authentication between them. Each party (client/server)
should authenticate the other party.
2.1. The authentication phase
In order to secure the e-business transaction, each party (cli-
ent/server) should authenticate the other party. The authenti-
cation mechanism grants a user speciﬁc access permissions
already predeﬁned and stored in the active directory. The
authentication process starts by authenticating the client to
the server and vice versa. The main reason for authenticating
the client is for access control decisions. The majority of exist-
ing systems provide unilateral authentication; the server
authenticates the client, but the client does not authenticate
the server. In this case, the client has no guarantees about
the identity of the party at the other side. The client is not sure
that he is communicating with a trusted party. He can send
conﬁdential information without any guarantee that this infor-
mation will go to the desired party. For that reason, it is very
important that the client authenticates the server before the
beginning of any transaction. Once the authentication process
succeeds, a secure SSL session is opened between the client and
the server.
The authentication mechanism is based on public key cryp-
tography. Public keys are used for authentication purpose by
signing and verifying data using private key and public key ele-
ments, respectively. The RSA algorithm is used for signing and
verifying data (Rivest et al., 1978). A third party is invoked: a
Certiﬁcate Authority (CA). The role of the CA is to issue cer-
tiﬁcates for the client and the server that conﬁrm that the keys
have been authorized. The public key and user’s identity are
bound together in a certiﬁcate signed by the CA, certifying
the accuracy of the binding. The CA issues the certiﬁcate by
signing the client or server public key (PuK) by using the
CA private key (PrKCa). Eqs. (1) and (2) illustrate the signing
and veriﬁcation functions. Both the client and the server can
verify the certiﬁcate of each other by using the CA public
key PuKCa. The client certiﬁcate and key pairs are stored in
a smart card. The server certiﬁcate and key pairs are stored
in the active directory.
Certificate ¼ RSA SignðPuKÞfPrKCag ð1Þ
PuK ¼ RSA VerifyðCertificateÞfPuKCag ð2Þ
The client visits the server web site and asks to log on. The web
server returns a web page with the plug-in tag <EMBED> to
get the plug-in executed on the client side. The server signs a
generated random number R with its private key PrKSer
(Eq. (3)).S1 ¼ RSA SignðRÞfPrKSerg ð3Þ
The server sends the random R and the signature S1 to the cli-
ent. Figure 3 illustrates the authentication mechanism pro-
posed by the e-business model. The client plug-in program
veriﬁes the signature S1 using PuKSer stored in the card.
The veriﬁcation algorithm, deﬁned by Eq. (4), is computed
by the smart card.
R0 ¼ RSA VerifyðS1ÞfPuKSerg ð4Þ
If R0 and R are equal, the signature is successfully veriﬁed and
the server is authenticated.
As illustrated by Eq. (5), the client plug-in computes a sec-
ond digital signature S2 of the random number retrieved from
the received web page using the client private key PrKCli.
S2 ¼ RSA SignðRÞfPrKClig ð5Þ
The plug-in then asks for smart card insertion and client PIN
presentation in order to retrieve the key pair and the certiﬁcate
stored in the card. The client plug-in posts R0, S1, S2, CertCard
and PuKCli to the server. Once received, the server veriﬁes the
certiﬁcate and the signature S2 according to Eqs. (6) and (7).
PuKCli0 ¼ RSA VerifyðCertCardÞfPuKCag ð6Þ
R00 ¼ RSA VerifyðS2ÞfPuKClig ð7Þ
If the terms calculated, PuKCli0 and R00, are equal to the terms
posted by the client, PuKCl and R0, the server conﬁrms
authenticity of the client and a new session is opened.
2.2. The integrity and privacy phase
For many applications and particularly in the ﬁnancial world,
the preservation of data integrity is the most important security
requirement. Here, we are concerned with thwarting any event
that results in the unauthorized tampering of the data. This in-
cludes not only the modiﬁcation of data but also the addition
or deletion. The integrity of the message can be assured by using
Public Key Cryptography. Data is encrypted by the private key
of the sender and decrypted by the associated public key of the
sender. The secret key is stored in the smart card and protected
by PIN. This will prevent any person who stole the card from
using or accessing the secret key stored on it. To be able to use
it, a person should have the physical card and know the PIN.
The need to preserve the secrecy of data exchanged between
the parties involved in the transaction is an important factor
that should be satisﬁed. The privacy relates to both the storage
of data and the transmission of data in a secure way. When a
cryptographic mechanism is employed, it is necessary to pre-
serve the secret and private keys from compromise. The mes-
sages exchanged between the two parties should be kept
secure. No unauthorized party should be able to explore the
data in the message. This challenge is met by encrypting the
communication between the parties by using secret key cryp-
tography. The key is kept in the smart card and protected by
PIN. The key cannot be read unless the correct PIN is pre-
sented (see Fig. 1).
Once the authentication process is completed, the second
phase consists of the decryption and integrity veriﬁcation of
the message received. Fig. 2 describes the computation process
performed between the client and the server in the integrity
and privacy phase. The sender’s client program realizes the fol-
lowing computations:
Figure 4 Architecture of the e-business transaction server.
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the server by calling the MD5 hash algorithm.
2. Signs the hash with the sender’s private key by calling the
RSA cryptogram.
3. Appends the signature to the document.
4. Encrypts the signed document with a symmetric key by
using 3DES cryptogram.
5. Encrypts the symmetric key with the receiver’s public key
using the RSA algorithm, and sends the encrypted message
to the server.
6. Once received, the server realizes the inverse computations
done by the client. It decrypts the symmetric key with the
receiver’s private key by using the RSA cryptogram.
7. Decrypt the message by using the 3DES symmetric key
decrypted in the previous step.
8. Veriﬁes the signature using the sender’s public key using the
RSA algorithm. In this step, the veriﬁcation process will
generate the hash digest related to the signature.
9. Computes the expected hash from the received message and
compares it with the hash digest calculated in the previous
step.
The hash functions as well as the signatures and veriﬁca-
tions cryptograms are computed on-board by the smart card.
The symmetric key, the private and public keys are stored also
in the smart card and protected by PIN. In order to perform
the transaction, the client program asks the user to insert a
smart card and enter a PIN number. The PIN number grants
access and allows the plug-into retrieve keys from the card.
If H1 = H2, privacy and integrity veriﬁcation succeeds,
otherwise the veriﬁcation fails.
3. Architecture of the proposed framework
The framework proposed in this paper consists of two hierar-
chical tiers modules. Each tier module is implemented as a
class library. The low level tier module handles all communica-
tions with smart card through the PC/SC Interface. The PC/
SC interface is deﬁned by the international standard protocol
ISO 7816. The PC/SC speciﬁcation ISO 7816 deﬁnes a low-le-
vel API to allow multiple applications to use the smart card de-
vice attached to a system independent of any technology or
operating system. This architecture is offering an interesting
ﬂexibility and portability, since the application can be devel-
oped using any language and use any smart card technology.
The APDU library wraps functions related to the smart card
APDU applicative commands implemented in the card. The
functions implemented at this level are available and used by
the second level tier. In Fig. 3, we present the architecture of
the e-business transaction framework from the client side view.
3.1. The smart card APDU library
The Smart Card APDU library handles all communication
with the smart card through the PC/SC library. All smart card
APDU applicative commands proposed by the smart card
developed prototype are available for upper layer as well as
some general commands to open a session with a card or close
a session. Each APDU command will be implemented as a
function that prepares the APDU buffer, transmits it to the
card, and then gets the message code relative to the execution
status of the command. In case the command should producedata, the APDU function should issue another APDU com-
mand in order to read the buffer containing data.
3.2. The security library
This library is in charge of combining some functions from the
low level library to deﬁne them as high level wrapped func-
tions. Each high level function calls functions from the low le-
vel library to perform all the needed steps. The security library
performs all high level steps related to the authentication,
integrity and privacy phases. For example, the ‘‘Login’’ func-
tion calls all the APDU functions that allocate the ‘‘Open-
Card’’ structure, establish a session and connect to the card,
select the application, ask the user to enter PIN via a graphical
user interface and verify it. This architecture makes integration
more ﬂexible, since the function ‘‘Login’’ can be called many
times from different libraries and modules. The function ‘‘sign-
RSA’’ loads the keys and the data to be signed, then calls the
RSA function implemented in the APDU library and retrieves
the signed data.
3.3. The e-business transaction server
The role of the server is to listen on a speciﬁc port waiting for
transaction requests. Once, the server receives a transaction re-
quest, it initiates the ﬁrst phase to authenticate the client. Once
the client is authenticated according the authentication mode
requested by the client, the server proceeds to check the privi-
leges assigned to this client stored in the active directory. Based
on the transaction requested and the privileges assigned to the
user, the server proceeds to execute the transaction in case the
client is allowed to do the requested transaction. Otherwise,
the server sends a message to the client informing him that
he is not authorized to do such a transaction. The information
exchange related to the transaction is done securely using an
encryption initiated by the client in Section 3.2. In Fig. 4, we
show the architecture of the e-business transaction server.
4. The smart card prototype
In order to validate the proposed framework, we describe in
the following the implementation of the developed prototype.
Any e-business system can use the libraries proposed in the
framework to secure the transactions and protect the ex-
changed information. The prototype is using the APDU and
the security libraries developed using the C++ language.
The APDU library implements all the APDU functions de-
ﬁned in the standard ISO 7816. An APDU applet was
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APDU library. The applet was loaded in a java card open plat-
form, Sun Microsystems (2006). The applet library was devel-
oped using the Java language. Once the applet is successfully
compiled, we use the Java Card Tool to generate the APDU
sequences to be uploaded in the card. The APDU tool is used
to exchange the APDU commands with the java card. We can
monitor the APDU execution with the java card by examining
the returned status code that should be 0x9000 for a successful
transaction. In case the transaction fails, the status code re-
turned by the card informs exactly what the error was.
The role of the APDU library is sending an APDU com-
mand to the card. In case of an error, the command returns
a speciﬁc code speciﬁc to the error. If the command is executed
without error, the card returns the code x9000. For the com-
mands expecting data, the card should extract the data from
the reading buffer. The APDU library implements all the
APDU commands needed by the security library such as: allo-
cOpenCard, establishContext, connectToCard, selectFile, read-
File, updateFile, verifyPin, compute3Des, computeRsa.
The security library wraps APDU commands in more high
level functions. The security library contains functions like:
openSession, login, sign3Des, signRSA. The function openSes-
sion makes all necessary steps to allocate the OpenCard struc-
ture, establish context with the resource manager, connect to
the card, and select the application. If any APDU command
fails, the openSession function should receive a speciﬁc error
code relative to the encountered problem. The signRSA func-
tion reads the data to be signed, loads the RSA certiﬁcate
and computes the signature using the RSA function and the
private or the public key of the other partner involved in the
transaction.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a smart card framework that allows
partners to achieve e-business transactions. The e-business
transactions are performed in a secure way by using advanced
cryptology computations. From the client side, the computa-
tions are performed by a smart card by using credentials (cer-
tiﬁcates, keys) stored in the card. These credentials are
protected by PIN and not accessible to the users. The key pairs
stored in the card are also used to create a secure sessionbetween the partners involved in the transaction. For that,
the smart card should be personalized by loading keys and set-
ting password to be used in e-business transactions. From the
server side, after authentication using the credentials stored in
the active directory, the server grants the client performing the
transactions access according to his privileges stored in the ac-
tive directory. A smart card system prototype was developed
for this purpose. The prototype was implemented based on
the proposed framework. Any e-business system can imple-
ment the client side using the proposed framework. The devel-
oped prototype handles only the client side. We developed a
light version of the server in order to use the framework and
validate our prototype. In the near future, we are planning
to implement the server side by using the active directory to
store and use credentials and privileges.
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